Measuring Systemic Risk: Robust Ranking Techniques Approach by Sadoghi, Amirhossein
Measuring Systemic Risk:
Robust Ranking Techniques Approach
Amirhossein Sadoghi
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management,
Frankfurt am Main E.mail: a.sadoghi@fs.de
Abstract
In this research, we introduce a robust metric to identify Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) in a
financial network by taking into account both common idiosyncratic shocks and contagion through counterparty
exposures. We develop an efficient algorithm to rank financial institutions by formulating a fixed point problem and
reducing it to a non-smooth convex optimization problem. We then study the underlying distribution of the proposed
metric and analyze the performance of the algorithm by using different financial network structures. Overall, our
findings suggest that the level of interconnection and position of institutions in the financial network are important
elements to measure systemic risk and identify SIFIs. Results show that increasing the levels of out- and in-degree
connections of an institution can have a diverse impact on its systemic ranking. Additionally, on the empirical side,
we investigate the factors which lead to the identification of Global Systemic Important Banks (G-SIB) by using a
panel dataset of the largest banks in each country. Our empirical results supports the main findings of the theoretical
model.
Keywords: Financial Network, Systemic Risk, SIFI, Nonsmooth Convex Problem
JEL classification: D85, E58, G01, G21, G33.
1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis has been the most significant economic event since the great depression in the 1930s
and had massive effects on economic growth and on the life of people during and after the financial crisis. It also
has raised a wide awareness of key players in a financial system and the requirement of quantitative tools to identify
and monitor them. In this context, in a financial system, the determination of the so-called Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (SIFI) as strategic players in the market is a main problem. Institutions (e.g. banks, insurance
companies or hedge funds) are systemically important if they are linked with strong transmission channels to others
or to institutions who are also systemically key players in the financial system. These institutions are relatively large,
vastly interconnected and dominate the system with a large scope of activities.
Although, several methods are proposed, there is no generally accepted way to determine the major institutions in
a financial system. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (Board, Financial Stability (2013)) intro-
duced methods and indicators to identify SIFIs, and reduce the probability of these institutions’ failures and smooth
the functioning of the financial system. BCBS ranked banks with regards to their size, complexity, interconnectedness
and ability to cause substantial disruption to the global financial activity. Financial Stability Board (FSB) and G20 use
similar indicators to identify Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFI) and update the list G-SIFI
1Corresponding Author, address: Sonnemannstrae 9-11 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Tel: +49(069)154008-873. We are grateful for the comments
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based on new information every year.
To reduce the consequences of SIFIs’ failure, regulators try to control the scope of activities of these financial insti-
tutions to limit the magnitude of their distress or failures to the public sector. On the one hand, recognizing institutions
as SIFI has higher costs, which prompted by extra requirements for regulation, possibility of no flexible approaches
by the regulators, and decreasing their competitiveness and economic strength in the domestic and international fi-
nancial market. On the other hand, it helps regulators to prevent disruptions to financial stability and enhance the
country’s economic strength. The regulation of SIFI seeks appropriate ways and tools to minimize potential negative
effects of the failure of these systemically important and high ranking institutions by restricting their activities and/or
re-restructuring their organization.
The distress or failure of a SIFI could crystallize systemic risk. A risk of default of a large fraction of the financial
system as a whole due to the spread of financial exposures throughout the system is called systemic risk. When the
institution is incapable to repay its debtors and fulfill its investor’s requirements it will be in an insolvent position. By
reason of interlinked financial exposures among institutions, this distress may spread throughout the whole financial
system in a domino fashion and it creates a cascade. This cascade causes a disturbance in the entire system and it may
spillover to the larger fraction of the economy (see: Hellwig (2009)).
One approach to measure systemic risk is tail measuring which calculates the co-dependence in the tails of insti-
tutions equity returns without giving consideration to interact with counterparties; Acharya et al. (2010); Brownlees
and Engle (2010) measured systemic risk by measuring the expected shortfall per bank conditional on a distressed
financial institution as the systemic capital deficit. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) introduced CoVaR to measure the
systemic risk of the financial system conditional on the system being in distress. This method is based on the value at
risk (VaR) in the median state of the financial status of an institution. Generally, these types of methods suffer from
the limitation of a very few number of extreme values of the magnitude of a financial crisis.
Another approach to measuring systemic risk is network analysis. The network approach provides a set of tech-
niques for analyzing the structure of whole entities and a range of theories to explain the mechanisms behind a
complex system. Battiston et al. (2012) studied complex networks of the controversial US Federal Reserve Bank
(FED) emergency program dataset and introduced DebtRank metric in a recursive way to determine the impact of the
distress of one or some financial institutions through their counterparties network. Sorama¨ki and Cook (2013) intro-
duced SinkRank metric to predict an influence of disturbance caused by the collapse of a bank in a payment system
and identify most affected banks in the system. e Santos and Cont (2010) analyzed the potentials for contagion and
systemic risk in an interlinked financial network and introduced a methodology for analyzing an institutional default,
metrics for detecting the systemic importance of institutions in a network of interconnected financial institutions. El-
liott et al. (2014) proposed a simple model of cross-holdings to analyze cascades in financial networks; they concluded
that diversification and integration of financial institutions have non-monotonic effects on financial contagions. These
methods are based on the feedback centrality of the financial network which we will explain later.
From this perspective, Allen and Gale (2000) examined the role of the network to the contagion of a small shock
and how it spreads to the whole system. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) proposed a model of static default cascade which
with given a set of banks that are directly interconnected through an interbank network of loans. They found a market-
clearing equilibrium, based on interdependencies within a system, by applying fixed point theory. The model built on
balance sheet information of banks including nominal (book) values of assets and liabilities, when banks’ assets are
not sufficient to cover their debt liabilities, banks become insolvent, and finally default. This model assumed insolvent
(default) banks cannot repay their counterparties’ debt liabilities and assets’ value will be reduced.
Another type of cascades begins with an illiquid institution which tries to sell its loans from its debtors, and
imposes liquidity stress to its counterparties, triggering a liquidity cascade in the entire system. Gai and Kapadia
(2010) studied a liquidity cascade mechanism to model the credit risk in early 2007 when some big investment banks
faced funding liquidity problems since they held partially liquid assets. Such banks started acquiring the liquidity of
their counterparties by reducing their interbank lending nearly completely. The static cascades advance through these
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mechanisms and after a series of deterministic iterations reach ”cascade equilibrium” or a steady state of the system.
Network perspective helps to have a system-wide perspective and to design effective mechanisms to prevent the
potential breakdown of the financial system. In the aftermath of the great financial crisis, both academic researchers
and regulators raise questions regarding how the financial network structure affects the propagation of systemic stress
in the economic system, how financial network’s linkages are important in determining the consequence of financial
interaction, and why several financial institutions suffer concurrently huge losses or default. Particularly, by studying
events and the network structure during the great financial crisis, they want to find out how networks are expected
to form when an individual institution has the discretion to select its partners and how the change of key players’
characteristics changes roles in the system.
Our paper addresses these questions and takes up these challenges by introducing an impact index as a metric
of measuring the systemic risk for application to default contagion on (directed) interbank networks. We present a
simple model based on the framework of Gai and Kapadia (2010) and the cascade mechanism of Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) model.
We formulate the problem of finding SIFIs as a fixed point problem, and propose an approximation solution to this
problem, and discuss uniqueness and existence of the solution. We then develop a robust network based algorithm to
rank financial institutions and to identify the SIFIs in a financial system. We discuss the computational performance
of our algorithm and assess in which practical situations this metric is relevant. This algorithm simulates the actual
cascade of bank defaults which end up to equilibrium. In our model, nodes of the network hit by individual or ag-
gregate shocks as an exogenous factor. Our model is setup to enable us have a robust estimation of system ranking
of financial institutions because it concerns the financial state of an institution as a function of a market condition.
Since small events due to a local stress can simply turn into a systemic crisis, the robust identification of SIFIs needs
to consider all possible scenarios.
Our paper also relates to recent contributions to functions of network to crystallize systemic risk and roles of key
players’ financial network and systemic risk by promoting a better understanding of the main factors like the level of
interconnection and network position, which lead to an institution to be considered as an SIFI. Past studies have shown
that to assess the SIFIs accurately , we need to take the complex and interconnected structure of the financial system
into account and focus on the effect of connectivity of the economic network as risk absorbers and/or amplifiers. A
speech by Andrew Haldane (2013), Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, pointed out
that a higher degree of connectivity of a financial network can absorb shocks, meanwhile it can spread shocks through
the system. One can see there is a disagreement perspective about the role of interconnectivity in the stability of the
network. The role of interconnection remains a central open question in the literature. On the one hand, studies by
Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) showed that a higher interconnected financial system is more stable
and by distributing the stress among more members can reduce its side effect on an individual member. Similar to
this perspective, Acemoglu et al. (2015) studied the link between the financial network structure and the probability
of systemic failure. They concluded that in the case of equal distribution of interbank debts and with having a small
number of affected institutions, a more densely interconnected system is more stable. On the other hand, some other
researches like Vivier-Lirimont (2006) argue that the probability of a systemic failure of a financial system might be
amplified by a large number of counterparties. A study by Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) considered the system-
wide importance of an interconnected system and highlighted the difference between systemic impacts of interbank
borrowing and lending on a financial system.
This ”robust-yet-fragile” characteristic of the financial system leads us to investigate a separate systemic impact
of the degrees of out-coming and in-coming of a network member on other members. Thus, we hypothesize that in a
financial network, increasing the degree of outcomes and incomes of a network member can increase and decrease the
likelihood of that member becoming a SIFI, respectively. We also expect that the systemic aspects of an institution
might be explained by means of its network and its dependency to other members of the network. These hypothesizes
are tested with the results of our numerical studies.
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On a broader level, our numerical experiments indicate main conclusions in the application of our framework
which is imposing restrictions on the level of interconnections of an institution can significantly reduce the likelihood
that the institution is ranked a SIFI. Nevertheless, raising the degree of out-comes (the number of borrowers) and the
degree of in-comes (the number of lenders) of a network member has different impacts on the outcome. The former
policy leads to increase by 1.520 percentage points and the later one leads to decrease by 1.685 percentage points that
possibility, respectively. These results are robust to different shocks in the network.
On the empirical side, we test these hypothesize by using a panel data of the largest banks in each country and
study which factors lead to identifying global SIFIs. The empirical outcome is consistent with our theoretical findings
which support the hypothesis of the association of the level of the interconnection and the probability of an institution
to be classified as an SIFI. The results of the empirical study indicate that raising the likelihood that an institution to
be ranked as an SIFI by 1.876 percentage points by increasing one percentage of interconnection levels.
Reminder of the paper
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of systemic risk and reviews some models of
financial network and their general properties. Section 3 explains main approaches for identification of SIFIs. Section
4 explains our model and introduces an impact index as a metric for to identify SIFIs by constructing a fixed problem,
and gives an approximation solution to this problem. In section 6, we demonstrate how to identify the SIFIs by
applying our algorithm in a real interbank network and compare it with an existing method. In section 7, we explain
the numerical simulation of interbank network and discuss on the efficiency and accuracy of a proposed solution.
Section 8 empirically examine the prediction of our theoretical model and investigates factors that lead to identifying
Global-SIFIs. Finally, this research is summarized in section 9.
2. The Static Cascade Model
In this section, we start with the mechanism of default contagion, explain how the default of one institution may
impact other institutions directly, leading to a so-called a default cascade. When the total of the decreasing in the
market value of the external assets of a bank exceeds its net worth and the total liabilities of a bank exceed its total
assets the institution will be incapable of repaying its debtors and fulfilling its investor’s requirements and will be in
a default position. This insolvent institution, with the condition not being bailed out by a government action, creates
stress for creditor banks’ interbank assets. If stress transmitted through the entire system, it will create a channel for
default contagion.
Modern financial system is a concentrated and interconnected system; consequently, it becomes less decompos-
able and vulnerable to systemically down fall. In this interconnected system, Contagion Dynamic can be defined as
follows: when a single bank starts to hoard liquidity; it creates challenges for banks that were beforehand borrowing
from this bank to meet their own liquidity conditions and have liquidity shortage. As a result, liquidity hoarding can
spread across the system due to the structure and connectivity of the interbank network.
Interconnectedness of financial institutions has been highlighted by recent researchers; (e Santos and Cont (2010);
Glasserman and Young (2015); Amini et al. (2012)) used a network model to study the probability of contagion
of financial distressing interbank networks. Hurd and Gleeson (2011) applied simulation studies based on network
models to calculating the expected size of contagion events models. One of the primary sources of systemic risk is
the contagion of the economic distress in the financial system. By reason of interlinked financial exposures among
institutions, this distress can spread throughout the entire of the financial system in a domino fashion.
Hurd (2015) described a static cascade model which creates a series of deterministic phases until it reaches to a
steady state cascade so-called cascade equilibrium. In the cascade equilibrium, no additional institutions is forced to
default. This static default cascade’s model begins with a set of institutions characterized by their balance sheets that
are interrelated with the directed network. The balance sheets cover the information of the nominal (book) values of
4
each institution’s total assets or/and liabilities. The general assumption is that a default institution may not able to
repay the nominal values of its debt, as a consequence the values of interbank assets will be reduced. Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) is a famous model of static cascade which reach a fixed point, equilibrium of the system, as the final phase
of the cascade.
In the context of microeconomics of banking, ”liquidity” is defined as an ability to fulfill requirements while a
bank comes due without happening inappropriate losses. Financial institutions have several ways of generating the
liquidity; e.g. borrowing from other banks (interbank loans) or the central bank, selling loans and raising capital.
Losing liquidity could have happened to a bank if it lost some fraction of its deposits due to the liquidity hoarding of
counterparties. Banks, to avoid suffering liquidity problems, immediately ask for available interbank liquidity. Con-
sequently, the illiquidity spreads through the entire financial system. There are theoretical and empirical evidences
that illiquid can lead to being insolvent while banks cannot pay their debts. To guarantee that sufficient liquidity is
maintained, it requires that banks monitor the significant individual liquidity risks personally as well as diversifying
counterparty risk. A bank wants to be sustainable in the financial system needs to attract significant liquid funds
and invests in higher return assets with less market liquidity. Stress testing against extreme scenarios helps them to
identify abnormal market liquidity circumstances and avoid sudden liquidity shifts.
”Solvency” is defined as an ability of a financial institution to accomplish its long-term expansion. A financial
institution becomes insolvent when its current liabilities exceed the current assets, consequently, they are under-
capitalized and insufficiency to discharge all debts. Insolvency of a large player in the banking system may amplify
the contagion risk to the entire system. For that reason, it is essential to model quantitatively the contagion effect and
insolvency of financial institutions and define the basic underlying requirements for controlling solvency risk of the
individual institution.
The balance sheet of an institution (regulated like a bank or/and no leveraged and no regulated like a hedge fund)
consists of the nominal values of assets and liabilities, which the aggregated of securities and contracts. Table 1
schematically characterizes a simplified balance sheet of an institution. Denote by Ai is the nominal value of assets of
institution i consists of nominal external assets (AE)i (fixed and liquid assets) and interbank asset (Ainte)i. Similarly,
the nominal value of liabilities Li includes nominal value of deposits (LD)i and interbank liability (Linte)i.
Assets Liabilities
Interbank Asset Aint Interbank Liability Linte
External Fixed Asset AE Deposits LD
· · · Capital Cpa
Table 1: A stylized balance sheet.
The institution’s nominal value equity (capital buffer) can be expressed as:
Cpai = (AE)i + (Aint)i − (Lint)i − (LD)i. (1)
When an individual bank is not be capable to meet all its obligations, it may face liquidity shortages, try to use its
own reserve or from other sources like interbank markets.
2.1. Interbank Network
The recent economic crisis has raised a wide awareness of the financial system need to be studied as a complex
network whose nodes are financial institutions, and links are their financial dependencies. Network approach plays
a central role in modeling the transmission of the information and determining how it spreads. Network Modeling
provides a better view of analysis the dynamical progress of the financial structure and explains how information and
financial flow passes through the system. In this perspective, systemic risk can be measured and quantified by the
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analysis of the dynamics the network.
In the aftermath of the great financial crisis, both researchers and regulators raise the question of how the structure
of network affects the propagation of systemic stress in an economic system. Network approach can help to create
some default scenarios and compare different network structures to understand how a structure of the network affects
the propagation of systemic stress in a crisis time.
Network science is mathematically formalized, and some theories and methods are built to study of interactions
patterns among nodes. Here, we provide fundamental concepts and definitions that are a basis for the language of
financial network analysis. One can find more information about economic network in Jackson et al. (2008).
In a general interbank network setting, the matrix A is defined as an adjacency matrix with the value of interbank
exposure if node i and node j are connected, 0 otherwise:
ai j =
{
1 interbank exposure (debtor i to creditor j)
0 no interbank relation (2)
This adjacency matrix with entries that are not only zero or one represents an interbank position point from a
debtor to a creditor. With given the network, we can add up the incoming connections (In-Degree) as a number of
creditors and outgoing connections (Out-Degree) as number of debtors. We define these network terminology as fol-
lows.
Definition 1. In-Degree
In a network, in-degree of one node represents the number of its incoming connections (creditors). The in-degree of
the node i is given by:
degini = #{ j ∈ A|a ji > 0}. (3)
Definition 2. Out-Degree
In this network, the out-degree of one node represents its number of outgoing links (debtors) and it is given by:
degouti = #{ j ∈ A|ai j > 0}. (4)
The correlation between in- and out-degree of nodes in a financial network indicates how the contagion of eco-
nomic distress spreads through the entire financial system. The degree distribution of the network, Pdegree(degin, degout)
is the empirical distribution of the fraction of nodes in a network with in-degree degin and out-degree degout.
The degree of nodes captures how nodes are connected, however, it cannot indicate the nodes position and distance
between them. To know which node attracts more attention, we need to look at other properties of a network. These
characteristics of the network show how a node is close to other nodes and how easy can reache others. Closeness
centrality (Freeman (1978)) is a node centrality indice, which is measured by the relative distance of a node to all other
nodes. Betweenness centrality index (Freeman (1977); Anthonisse (1971)) is another centrality index which indicates
who has control over the information or financial flow of the network. We define these centrality measurements as
follows.
Definition 3. Closeness Centrality Closeness Centrality (CC) measures how far a node from other nodes with calcu-
lating relative distances between nodes. Closeness Centrality (CC) is defined as:
CCi = (n − 1)(
∑
j
di j)−1, (5)
where di j is the shortest distance between nodes i and j,in a weighted networks by introducing. Dijkstra (1959).
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Definition 4. Betweenness Centrality The total number of paths between node j and node k is called P jk and Pijk is
a number of paths pass through node i. Betweenness Centrality (BC) of the node i in a network is defined by:
BCi =
(
n − 1
2
)−1 ∑
j,k,i
Pijk
P jk
. (6)
Betweenness Centrality measures the intermediary characteristics of a node. All of these measurements capture
different aspects of network structure, and none of measurements can dominate others.
Due to lack of access to real-world banking network, there only exist a few empirical types of research in this
field. e Santos and Cont (2010) described a methodology to verify potentials for contagion and systemic risk. This
study used on an unique dataset of mutual exposures of Brazilian financial institutions to analyze the network struc-
ture role in the estimation of systemic risk. The topology of an interbank payment network between commercial
banks over the Fedwire Funds Service has been studied by Sorama¨ki et al. (2007). Mu¨ller (2006) assessed the Swiss
interbank network and measured systemic risk via mutual interbank exposure and spillover effects of a bank risk on
other banks in the system. These empirical studies of structural and topological aspects of real-world networks show
that in-degree and out-degree of network’s linkages are heavy-tailed distributed and follow power laws distribution
with the heterogeneous interconnections structure. The correlation between them has verified the effects of the stress
contagion. These studies found certain properties of the network changed considerably immediately after the finan-
cial crisis. Based on these empirical findings, we create a random network model to simulate interbank networks and
analysis financial systems.
Generally, a financial system can be modeled as a network, that includes a set of nodes V(i∈{1,...,n}) referred to finan-
cial institutions and the network is formed as direct or indirect relations. The canonical form a network is an undirected
graph, which nodes are connected without direction. This type of network models can represent economic relations
or partnership, friendships in social sciences. The second type network is modeled as a direct network in which a
node can be connected to another node, in such that the second node is not being connected to the first node. In this
directed network topology, node i and the link Ωi j represent institutions and the interbank exposure, respectively. At
time of the default of institution j, the institution i faces an exposure cost Ωi j (directed edge from a debtor to a creditor).
Total asset value invested by institution i in banking activities is:
Ai = (AE)i +
∑
i
Ωi j.
Similarly, total nominal value of liabilities of institution i is:
Li = (LD)i +
∑
j
Ωi j.
Matrix Π represents the matrix of n × n interbank exposure matrix (see: Figure 1). This matrix contains the
information on exposure magnitude a node on its counterparties in the system. The summation of rows and columns
gives the information on the interbank liability an assets.
Typically, financial networks are large weighted networks. In a weighted network, the adjacency matrix con-
tains information on weights represented the relative nodes strengths. Later, we will discuss about properties of the
weighted adjacency matrix and how to use it in our model.
3. SIFI
As a major effect of the complexity of the contemporary financial network and lack of an adequate methodology
for measuring systemic risk, anticipating the impact of defaults in the financial system becomes a challenging work.
For a long time, the size of financial institution’s balance sheet has been used to rank the institutions in the system,
and large institutions based on their balance sheet size are stated as ”Too Big to Fail”. However, the recent economic
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Figure 1: The Matrix of Interbank Exposure.
1 2 . . . n

0 Ω12 . . . Ω1n (Lint)1 (LE)1 L1
Ω21 0 . . . Ω2n (Lint)2 (LE)2 L2
Π =
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
Ωn1 Ωn2 · · · 0 (Lint)n (LE)n Ln
(Aint)1 (Aint)2 · · · (Aint)n
(AE)1 (AE)2 · · · (AE)n
A1 A2 . . . An
The presentation of the matrix of interbank exposure. The sum-
mation of elements of columns and rows are interbank assets and
liabilities, respectively.
crises has indicated that relatively small institutions can have the significant impact the financial system.
There are two main approaches for identification of SIFIs: model-based approach and indicator-based approach.
The first approach is based on main indicators, to comprise broad characteristics of financial institutions. The second
one is based on dynamics of financial institutions’ relationships.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCSBS) Board, Financial Stability (2013) applied the first ap-
proach and developed an indicator-based measurement for assessing the systemic importance of Global Systemic
Important Banks (G-SIBs). It is based on five equally weighted indicators: size, complexity ,interconnectedness,
substitutability (financial infrastructure) and cross-jurisdictional activity. In April 2009, the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) was established to develop strategies for extra regulation of G-SIBs. BCSBS updates the list G-SIB based on
information from FSB and publishes the new group of systemic important banks annually. In the US, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) (Weistroffer et al. (2011)) use slightly different aspects of company’s potential
including size, lack of alternatives, interconnectedness, leverage, liquidity risk, maturity mismatch and present regu-
latory inspection. An SIFI may be an investment bank (e.g. Lehman Brother), a hedge fund (e.g. Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM)), or an insurer (e.g. AIG). The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) devel-
oped a similar assessment methodology to identify to Global Systemically Important insurers (G-SIIs) whose can pose
the risk to the financial system. BCSBS classified institutions which their activities are limited to a specific region
as Domestic (national) Systemically Important Institution (D-SIFI) which have an impact only a specific country’s
economy.
The academic approach to identify SIFI is the model-based approach. The model-based methodology to analyze
the systemic importance of financial institutions goes back to theoretical papers by Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas
et al. (2000). Their findings highlighted the significant the role of the structure of the financial network in transmit-
ing countriparty risk. Model-based approaches (e.g. Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) suggested by Acharya et al.
(2010) and COVaR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) ), based on market data risk measure Value at Risk
(VaR), Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and asset price correlations.
Due to lack of sufficient information for all financial institutions, models’ instability over business cycles and
the complexly of financial system, modeling approach is not robust and cannot capture all the ways that an institu-
tion is systemically important. To overcome the traditional methods limitations, some network-based models were
developed. The DebtRank algorithm by Battiston et al. (2012) and SinkRank by Sorama¨ki and Cook (2013), as
default-cascade approaches, estimated the impact of shocks in a financial network and predicted the magnitude of
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disturbance triggered by the failure of an institution. The network model by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) studied the
spread of defaults through an interbank network of nominal obligations and calculated the clearing payments vector
to determine the losses in the network. Based on this model, we propose a metric to identify SIFI with taking into
account both common idiosyncratic shocks and contagion through counterparties’ exposures.
To capture different dimensions of the systemic importance of an institution, we need to measure various aspects
of its financial activities. This measurement should be robust in terms of uncertainty in market data quality and ex-
ogenous factors, and to be applicable for all types of financial institutions. Indicator-based measurement is a simple
method to rank institutions and is robust with respect to some uncertainties of the modeling approach. Nonetheless,
this approach is static and cannot reflect dynamics of the financial system.
Basel III agreement introduced a set of tools and methodology to regulate the SIFIs, to reduce the probability of
failure and limit SIFIs failures consequences. As a result, it can enhance the financial stability and mitigate the cost
of governments’ interventions. These tools can be classified in following categories: (i) the reduction of the SIFIs
size: institutions’ size represents the potential of posing risk to the entire system partially, (ii) re-organizing the SIFIs’
structure can reduce the systemic importance of an institution, (iii) limiting of the institution activity can reduce the
contagion of stress through the system, (iv) an additional capital buffer can reduce the probability of SIFIs’ failure and
(v) improving store liquidation of SIFIs may help in the event of failure. The scope of these regulations is limited to
available information on institutions’ characteristics and their activities.
4. The Model
In this section, we explain our model and introduce an index to quantify financial relations among institutions, re-
garding the impact of the distress of institutions to their counter-parties across the entire system in a recursive way. In
this approach, we determine systemically important institutions by analyzing the dynamics of their dependencies. We
use a directed network where the vertices represent financial institutions, and the edges represent financial relations.
Our model studies network effects of liquidity hoarding procedure. Mainly, it shows how liquidity shortages can
spread through the financial system via interbank linkages. The model examines the financial system structure, such
as joint distribution of lending and borrowing links and connectivity degrees to understand how shocks spread.
The system at time t = 0 is in a normal state and the network is formed. At time t = 1, the system is hit by a shock
or several shocks which have impacts network. The stressed nodes start to transmit shocks to their counterparties and
cascade begins. Basically, we assume there is no channel for fire sale and changing of all external cash flows, assets
throughout the cascade are not considered. At time t = 2, the cascade continues until it reaches equilibrium (See
Figure: 2).
 
 
 
 
Model 
t=0 
The network is formed 
t=1 
The system is hit by  shocks 
t=2 
The system reaches to a 
cascade equilibrium 
Figure 2: The model
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Our network setting (economy) has a simple structure: nodes contain information on balance sheets of institutions
and weighted direct edges represent the amount of exposure of a node on its counterparties. In this economy, we
use solvency condition index of an institution, expressed in Gai and Kapadia (2010), when the current institution’s
liabilities exceed its current assets. A bank becomes insolvent when its current liabilities exceed its current assets.
Gai and Kapadia (2010) defines the solvency condition as follows:
(1 − φ)(Aint)i + (AE)i − (Lint)i − (LD)i > 0, (7)
where φ is the portion of banks’ obligation to a defaulted bank. We can determine the solvency condition of bank (i)
with having an assumption which is losing of interbank asset of an instituation at time of default (Gai and Kapadia
(2010)).
From Gai and Kapadia (2010) solvency condition, equation (7), we have:
(1 − φ)(Aint)i + (AE)i − (LD)i
(Lint)i
> 1. (8)
This condition shows the ability of an institution over a cash flow time horizon to meet its obligation when debts are
collected by its debtors. With using network centrality measurements, we define solvency index as following:
Definition 5. Solvency Index
Let εsh be the aggregate or individual deposits’ shocks. From equation (8) we have:
χi =
(1 − φ)(Aint)i + (AE)i − (LD)i + εsh
(Lint)i
(9)
≈ (1 − φ)deg
in
i (Ω¯)
i + (AE)i − (LD)i + εsh
degouti (Ω¯)
i
, (10)
where (Ω¯)i is the average of interbank exposures of node i and degini and deg
out
i are in-degree and out-degree of node
i.
Solvency Index of node i (S olvi) is defined as institution (i)’s inability to satisfy the solvency condition and then
contagion starts to spread. This index cab be expressed by:
S olvi = min(χi, 1). (11)
In a counterparty network, the vulnerability weight of a node can be defined as a fraction of capital which is
decreased by the impact of the default of its counterparty. With given the capital buffer of the institution i Cpai, which
is used against financial risk, we define the vulnerability weight index as the following:
Definition 6. Vulnerability Weight
Vulnerability weight of the institution i is expressed as its ability to mitigate the interbank activities tensions which
make the financial system susceptible to counterparty risk. It can be quantified as the proportion of the capital of an
institution used against interbank exposure:
wi j = min(
Ωi j
Cpai
, 1). (12)
The economic value of the impact of one institution on others is calculated by multiplying the impact by the rela-
tive economic value of its counterparties. We define Relative Impact as a fraction of solvency index one institution on
accumulative solvency indexes of its counterparties.
The impact value of an individual institution on its counterparties can be defined as:
p˜i =
∑
j
wi jri, (13)
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where r is the solvency ratio which represents the relative solvency of an institution to its counterparties:
ri =
S olvi∑
j S olvi
{ j|ai j > 0}. (14)
In addition, an institution’s counterparties have an impact, we add the second term in equation (14) for an indirect
impact via neighbors. We define the corresponding Impact Index as measuring of the expected loss, which is generated
by the failure of a group of institutions as follows.
Definition 7. Impact Index
Similar to Battiston et al. (2012), we define the impact index of institution i as follows:
pi = α
∑
j
wBCii j ri︸        ︷︷        ︸
expected loss of institution’s failure (direct effects)
+ β
∑
j
wCCii j p j︸         ︷︷         ︸
expected loss by counter-parties’ failure (indirect effects)
(β = 1 − α), (15)
where α < 1 is the probability of imposing shock by a node and β = 1 − α is the probability of reviving shocks by
counterparties , and CCi and BCi are the closeness and Betweenness centrality of the node (institution) i.
The first term is measuring the proportional of the expected loss, generated by the failure of an institution (direct
effects), and the second proportion can be coming from the failure of its counterparties (indirect effects). As above
mentioned, in a network the closeness centrality of a node indicates the relative distance of the node to other nodes and
another centrality measurement which is called betweenness centrality indicates who has control over flow between
others. In other words, these indexes can show the scope of impacts of an institution’s distress or failure on the system.
With the higher value of betweenness centrality of a node shows the vulnerability of a node to control the transmission
of counterparties’ stress. Similarly, the higher value of the closeness of a node can intensify the impact of a node on
its counterparties.
4.1. Problem Formulation
The vector p contains information on impact indexes of institutions in the network, we can rewrite equation (15)
in a matrix form:
p = Mp, (16)
where let matrix M defined on Rn×n as a non-negative (positive) matrix from equation (16):
M = αWCC + βWBCR, (β = 1 − α), (17)
where the matrix R is a diagonal matrix with entries on the main diagonal are the vector r. We can decompose a
perturbed matrix M into two matrices: nominal matrix P which contains information on vulnerability weighted of
impact indexes of institutions and a perturbation matrix Ξ which includes information on the aggregate or individual
deposits’ shocks εsh.
M = P + Ξ (18)
Let P be a set of perturbed matrix and M ⊂ P. We are looking for a robust solution p¯ of the dominant eigenvector
of matrix M.
Indeed, finding central nodes which pose counterparty risk to the system can be used to identify systemically
important financial institutions in the financial system. We can formulate this problem as a fixed point problem and
find a robust Eigenvalue solution. In the following proposition we define a robust Eigenvalue solution to this fixed
point problem.
.
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Proposition 1. Robust Eigenvalue solution
The vector p¯ is defined as
p¯ = Mp¯ (19)
is a robust solution of the fixed point problem on matrix M if
p¯ ∈ Argmin
p∈Σ
(max
εsh∈Ξ
||(P + Ξ)p − p||2 | ||ξ||1 ≤ ), (20)
where Σ := {u2 ∈ Rn×n|∑i ui = 1}, ||ξ|| = ∑i j |ξi j| and  > 0.
Proof. Let Σ be a set of eigenvectors, we rewrite the equation (19) as a convex optimization problem with measuring
the goodness of the solution in norm ||.||2:
min
p⊂Σ
||Mp − p||2. (21)
Matrix M = P+Ξ be a perturbed matrix and a subset of P and matrix Ξ is a perturbation and includes information
on εsh. In other words this information is representation of uncertainty about the aggregate or individual deposits.
The fixed point problem (19) can be reduced to a convex optimization problem (21) and it can be reformulated as
finding a dominant eigenvector of a positive matrix.
With fixing total amount of uncertainty by ||ξ||1 = ∑i j ξi j < , a robust solution of the fixed point problem (19) can
be expressed as a solution of the following min-max problem:
min
p⊂Σ
(max
M⊂P
||Mp − p||2). (22)
[Juditsky and Polyak (2012), Proposition 2] proved in the case norm 2, vector p¯ is an unique solution due to
the strict convexity on Rn×n. In fact p¯ coincides with p if  is small enough and all eigenvalues lay inside the
1 − λi > 0; i = 2; . . . ; n.
4.2. Solution (Successive Approximation Method)
The primary fixed point problem (19) is formulated as the problem of finding a robust score vector p¯. Matrix M
is a weighted adjacency matrix of a graph with n connected nodes with outgoing and incoming links. One can apply
standard eigenvector centrality and PageRank methods (Page and Winograd (1998)) to this problem, however, there
exists several issues related using these methods. Firstly, matrix M is neither column-stochastic nor row-stochastic
i.e. it is not a square matrix of non-negative with each row or each column summing to one. In this case, vector p¯
is not unique: typically in the real-world financial network, there are some disconnected subgraphs as well as cycles
and solution for cyclic matrix it may converge slowly. Secondly, financial networks are large weighted networks,
which are often perceived as being harder to analyze compare to their unweighted counterparts. Thus the eigenvector
centrality and standard PageRank cannot detect cascade in this system.
Since matrix M is an irregular matrix i.e. there is no robust dominant vector p¯ in an explicit form, therefore,
we solve the structured convex optimization problem (21) approximately. For a medium-size problem in a medium
size financial network, we can apply interior-point methods as a continuous nonlinear optimization methodology. In
a large-scale financial network, this problem can be solved with a method called mirror-descent family ( see: Nazin
and Polyak (2009)Lan et al. (2012). For a huge counterpartys network, if the adjacency matrix is sparse enough, the
method that is explained in Nesterov (2014) can be applied. Juditsky and Polyak (2012) found a numerical approxi-
mation solution to the similar eigenvector problem, and it works based on the power method. This method can be used
in the case adjacency matrix has linearly independent eigenvectors and the eigenvalues can be ordered in magnitude a
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|λ1| > |λ2| > · · · > |λn|.
Similar to Eisenberg and Noe (2001), vector pk denotes amount of systemic impact of institutions in the system at
the end of the kth step of the cascade. Hurd (2015) explained ”cascade equilibrium” of the system while there is not
default occurred in the system. These series of finite steps will be monotonically continued until the system converges
to a fixed point in a cascade equilibrium. We use the power method as a standard algorithm to compute the dominate
eigenvector of a eigenvalue problem. This method can be described briefly as follows: in the first step of initial values
of p0 should be chosen. In the second step, the dominate term σk+1 of Mpk should be determined. Finally, we com-
pute the next dominate eigenvector: pk+1 = 1
σk+1
Mpk. After several iterations the result of the algorithm converges to
largest eigenvalue which is called the dominant eigenvalue of the matrix M. One of the main advantage of this method
is that it can be done with any norm without normalizing the matrix.
With using the basic idea of the power method, we present a successive approximation method for computing
vector p¯ as ranks of systemically important financial institutions, in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Impact Index
Impact Index for (directed) interbank networks can be determined as a solution of the fixed point iteration:
pk+1 =
k
k + 1
WCCpk +
1
k + 1
WBCr, (23)
where k is the number of iterations needed in order the system converges to a fixed point monotonically.
Proof. Suppose that vector pk denotes information of systemic impact of institutions at the end of the kth step of the
cascade.
We can write the vector pk as a linear combination of vectors from previous steps of the cascade:
pk =
p1 + p2 + · · · + pk−1
k
=
p1 + M1p1 + · · · + Mk−1p1
k
.
We apply the power method with averaging to minimize problem (21):
min ||Mp − p||2 = min ||M
kp1 − p1||2
k
≤ Constant
k
,
By choosing p1 = WBCr and from equation (17), we will get this recursive rule format:
pk+1 =
k
k + 1
WCCpk +
1
k + 1
WBCr.
With the following equation (17) we can define matrix Mk as :
Mk =
k
k + 1
WCC +
1
k + 1
WBCR.
At each step of the cascade, the impact index vector is computed as follows:
pk+1 = Mkpk (24)
That means α = kk+1 and β = 1 − kk+1 are weighting coefficients of matrix and representing the probabilities of
direct and indirect shocks of a node.
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To construct a solution, we use a successive approximation to find a fixed point, and state and prove the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium by means of the contraction mapping theorem.
Let X be an economy (financial system) defined as a set of impact indexes of institutions {1, · · · , n} denote by
X1,X2, · · · ,Xn 1. Let Φ : X→ X be a continuous transformation function that maps X onto itself. A fixed point of Φ
is an element Xi ∈ X for which Φ(X) = X. We use the notation Φ(Xi) = Xi in place of Xi = MT Xi.
To compute the successive approximations and prove the existence of a fixed point, we use an iterative scheme:
Xn+1 = Φ(Xn){n=1,2,··· }. With using the Brouwer fixed-point theorem and defining sufficient conditions on Φ and M,
we prove the existence and uniqueness of the systemic impact index in a banking network.
Proposition 3. Existence and Uniqueness of the Systemic Impact Index
In a financial system consists of N firms with interbank activities being represented by matrix M and by a continuous
transfer function Φ,
(a) there exists an index associated with the ranking of systemically important firms in the network;
(b) transfer function Φ has a unique fixed point in matrix M.
Proof. Part (a): Φ : X → X is defined as a continuous, transformation function that maps X onto itself. Based on
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, Φ is a continuous mapping function. Therefore, there exists a fixed point Xi ∈ X.
Vector X is an economy that is a set of firms corresponding to an interbank equilibrium of a financial network.
Note that any interbank equilibrium in this model is a fixed point of Φ.
Part (b): if there exist two fixed points X1 and X2,
d(X1,X2) = d(Φ(X1),Φ(X2)) < θd(X1,X2), (25)
where d(X1,X2) = ||X1 − X2||2 with condition 0 ≤ θ < 1. We should prove that d(X1,X2)→ 0.
According to the Perron–Frobenius theorem, proved by Perron (1907) and Frobenius et al. (1912), for matrix M
(a real square matrix with non-negative entries and an irreducible matrix since from a connected graph), there exists a
dominant eigenvector X¯ with strictly positive components, which can be expressed as
Xˆ = argmin
X∈∑ {||X¯ −MX¯||2 + }.
Similarly, we have MX = X−, and Xˆ coincides with x¯ if  is small enough. Then, we can obtain a linear convergence
in the fixed-point iterations.
Given the mapping function Φ on X → X,
d(X1,X2) = d(Φ(X1),Φ(X2))
= d(MX1,MX2)
= d(X1 − 1,X2 − 2)
< d(X1,X2) − d(1, 2)
≤ θd(X1,X2),
we can write the above equation in a general form
d(Xn,Xn+1) = d(Φ(Xn),Φ(Xn+1))
≤ θd(Xn,Xn+1).
1In this section, for the sake of simplicity we change the notation.
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The recurrence form gives us
d(Xn,Xn+1) ≤ θnd(X0,X1)
(n = 1, 2, ...),
which implies d(Xp,Xq) → 0 for any arbitrary p, q in n = 1, 2, · · · . Thus, the interbank equilibria of the model is
basically unique.
4.3. Algorithm
After we model the finding SIFIs in an interbank network as a fixed point problem formulate it as a convex opti-
mization problem, we explain the approximation solution. Now we specify an algorithm to describe the mathematical
process of solving this problem with approximated solution.
In the initial step of this proposed algorithm, we simulate a financial network with a complete or scaled free ran-
dom networks, and then we calculate adjacency matrix corresponding to each network. We define the impact of one
node on its indirect successors in terms of a recursive equation: pk+1 = Mkpk, where k is the iteration number of
solution procedure. With given a weighted adjacency matrix of the interbank network, the first step of this procedure
is specifying the initial value of impact index.
Following algorithm explains this procedure:
Algorithm 1
Step 1: begin: p1 as initial value for impact index
p1 = WBCr.
Step 2: k-th iteration: pk = Mkpk+1,
where
Mk = kk+1 W
CC + 1k+1 W
BCr.
Step 3: Stop condition: |pk − pk+1| < Tolerance, choosing tolerance is dependent upon the size of the problem.
In order to get a robust ranking index, we repeat above algorithm several times and each time the system hits by a
shock. In the section, we discuss the underline distribution of Impact Index and show it converge in average to robust
ranking index.
5. Statistical Inference on Impact Index
In this section, we study properties of an underlying distribution of the impact index and we model the probability
of an institution considered as a SIFI in a financial network. In simulation section we estimate this probability condi-
tion on SIFIs’ characteristics.
Suppose that impact indexes of institutions {1, · · · , n} X1,X2, · · · ,Xn are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) sample from a distribution function F (x) = P(X ≤ x). The function F (x) is an unknown function, and there is
no hypothesis about its’ parameters’ value.
We define the empirical (cumulative) distribution, with mass 1n for each data point as follows:
F˜n(x) = 1n
n∑
i=1
1{Xi ≤ x},
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where the indicator function is defined by
1{Xi ≤ x} =
1, if Xi ≤ x,0, otherwise.
According to the fundamental theorem of statistics (Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem Tucker (1959)) we can determine
the asymptotic behavior of the empirical distribution function F˜n(x) which it converges to F (x) almost surely by the
strong law of large numbers as n→ ∞:
sup
x∈R
|F˜n(x) − F (x)| → 0 almost surely,
To calculate a confidence for distribution function F (x), find a confidence region C(x) such that
P(F (x) ∈ C(x)) ≥ 1 − α′, ∀x ∈ R, (26)
we use a result of Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW ) inequality Massart (1990):
P{sup
x
|F (x) − F˜ (x)| > } ≤ 2 exp(−2n2) = α′. (27)
Then, a confidence band for function F (x) for all n is:
P(L(x) ≤ F(x) ≤ U(x)) ≥ 1 − α′, ∀x ∈ R (28)
where
L(x) = max{F˜n(x) −
√
1
2n
log
2
α′
, 0}, (29)
U(x) = min{F˜n(x) +
√
1
2n
log
2
α′
, 1}. (30)
5.1. Threshold of Classification
In order to identify SIFI, we need to sort impact indexes of institutions and define a threshold for each class of
SIFI. This threshold can be defined by the quantile value of distribution function F (x).
Let ρ : {1, · · · , n} −→ {1, · · · , n} be a operator such that Xρ(i) ≤ Xρ( j) if i < j.
After ordering impact indexes, we define the order statistics (Xρ(i) = X(i)) as follows:
X(1) ≤ X(2) ≤ · · · ≤ X(n).
Let up be the quantile which divides the CDF F (x) into two parts, and it is defined as:
up = F −1(p) = inf{x : F (x) ≥ p}, (31)
where the function F −1 : (0, 1)→ R is a quantile function.
This function is left-continuous function and (Van der Vaart (2000) Lemma 21.1) stated that for any series of
CDFs, F˜ −1n (x) converges to F −1(x) almost surely if F˜n(x) converges almost surely to F (x). We use this result and
define u˜pn as an estimator of quantile up:
16
u˜pn = F˜ −1n (p) = inf{x : F˜n(x) ≥ p}, (32)
We identify SIFIs who their impact index less or equal to the quantile up. If at least r number of institutions with
impact index less or equal to up, with the probability of an institution classified as a SIFI P(Xi ≤ up) = F (up) , the
probability of M =
∑n
i=1 1{Xi ≤ up} institutions are ranked as SIFI is:
P(M ≥ r) = P(X(r) ≤ up) (33)
= P(X(r) ≤ u˜pn) for all n (34)
=
n∑
i=r
(
n
i
)
F˜n(upn)i(1 − F˜n(u˜pn))n−i. (35)
To have a robust estimation of the threshold, we construct a 100(1-α′)% confidence interval for quantile up with
any k, l ∈ N
P(X(k) ≤ up ≤ X(l)) = 1 − α′. (36)
Accourding to results of [Van der Vaart (2000) chapter 21], and by using the strong law of large numbers as
n→ ∞:
lim
n→∞ u˜pn = F˜
−1
n (p)
= F −1(p) almost surely
= up.
By applying the probability integral transformation we define random variablesUi{1,··· ,n} = F˜n(Xi){1,··· ,n} as samples
of uniform distribution, we have:
P(X(k) ≤ up ≤ X(l)) ≈ P(X(k) ≤ F˜ −1n (p) ≤ X(l))
= P(F˜n(X(k)) ≤ p ≤ F˜n(X(l)))
= P(U(X(k)) ≤ p ≤ U(X(l)))
To construct two sided confidence band we choose k < l and divide mass α′/2. We determine the upper confidence
limit of quantile up as follows:
l = inf{i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1} : P(up ≤ X(i)) ≤ α′/2}.
Similarly, the lower confidence limit of quantile up is:
k = sup{i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1} : P(up ≤ X(i)) ≥ 1 − α′/2}.
5.2. Asymptotic Distribution
We can use the result of equation: (33) to obtain asymptotic distribution of impact index for larger size networks.
Let u˜pn be the estimator of quantile up and for the fixed value k, r = n − k is a random variable. The asymptotic
distribution of ordered impact index variables is defined:
P(X(r) ≤ u˜pn) = P(X(n−k) ≤ u˜pn) =
n∑
i=n−k
(
n
i
)
F (u˜pn)i(1 − F (u˜pn))n−i.
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With using a result of [Van der Vaart (2000) chapter 21] we obtain Poisson approximation of the binomail distri-
bution as follows:
lim
n→∞P(X(n−k) ≤ u˜pn) =
k∑
j=o
e−λ
λ j
j!
, (37)
where
λ = lim
n→∞ n(1 − F (u˜pn))
.
The Poisson approximation can explain better since impact index variable is long tailed distributed and the variance
is large.
5.3. Classification Probability
We can define a probability distribution over a set of classes of SIFIs and Non-SIFIs to obtain the class that a par-
ticular institution falls into. These probabilistic classifiers provide the information on the classification of institutions
to predict the class of each institution with a degree of certainty.
Let (Yit)I∈{1,··· ,N},t∈1,··· ,T be ordered categorical variables expressed systemic rank of institutions i at time t. The
cumulative probability of these categorical variables with given set explanatory variables x is expressed as:
P(Yit ≤ j|xit) = G(βxit), j = 1, · · · , J,
where J is the number of groups and function G is a cumulative distribution function. It is assumed the coefficient
vector β is not vary between the categories.
The explanatory variable xit captures the information on features of institutions related size, complexity, and in-
terconnectedness. In the section (3), we discussed briefly different factors to identify SIFIs. All of the factors can be
the significant effect on the probability of an institution becomes a SIFI.
The variable αi contains time invariant information on individual characteristics of institutions. The probability of
the institution i at time point t is assigned to systemic rink category j is conditional on the explanatory variables xit
and the individual effect variable αi:
P(Yit = 1|xit, αi1) = G(β1xit + αi1),
P(Yit = j|xit, αi j) = G(β jxit + αi j) − G(β1xit + αi1), j = 2, · · · , J − 1,
P(Yit = J|xit, αiJ) = G(βJ xit + αiJ).
Note that the cumulative distribution function G can be expressed as a standard normal or logistic distribution
function, and coefficient vector β and αi can be estimated by panel ordered probit or logit models.
6. Example of Financial Network
In this section, we demonstrate how to identify the SIFIs by applying algorithm 4.3 in a real interbank payment
network. Since financial institutions’ failures are atypical, and the corresponding data are mostly confidential, we use
a small sample dataset from Sorama¨ki and Cook (2013) (FNA simulator platform: www.fna.fi).
The interbank payment system is the backbone for all financial transactions to facilitate the monetary exchange
between institutions. This system provides a set of procedures, laws, standards and requirements that can be unique
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Figure 3: Example of Interbank Network of Payment Transaction
This figure shows an interbank payment network of payment transaction. The nodes are representatives
of banks and links are representative of payment transactions. We created this plot with FNA simulator
platform (www.fna.fi)
for each financial system. An electronic payment system includes the flow of fund and the flow of information about
counterparties and the value of transactions (for more information see: Listfield and Montes-Negret (1994)).
We compare our result with SinkRank method introduced by Sorama¨ki and Cook (2013) . Their method is based
on absorbing Markov chains with fixed transition probability to model dynamics of liquidity cascade in a payment
system. Sorama¨ki and Cook (2013) used a payment system to identify banks which are the most affected by the fail-
ure. Table 2 demonstrates results obtained from our algorithm (algorithm 4.3) and SinkRank method. Our algorithm
uses slightly different assumptions, however, both method consistently can identify SIFIs in a network.
Results show that systemic risk index has a positive correlation between a number of in- and out-degrees of the
network but not with banks size. In addition, our algorithm can identify institutions which are largely connected with
strong transmission channels to SIFIs. In the past, the size of financial institution’s balance sheet, like total capital or
total financial transaction, has been used to rank the institutions in the system, however, the interconnectedness of the
financial system can be a major reason for failing the whole of the system.
7. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we explain the numerical simulation of interbank network and compare our approximation solu-
tion with an optimum solution on simulated networks. Furthermore, we show the factors that lead to an insinuation
become systemic important. These factors are the spotlight of regulations of SIFIs to reduce the probability of SIFIs’
failures and enhance the financial stability.
As a summary: at time t = 0, the network will be formed, and at time t = 1 nodes will receive individual or aggre-
gate deposit shocks. Then a default cascade will start and our algorithm try to identify SIFIs. The cascade continues
until reach equilibrium and the algorithm might converge and find SIFIs.
We create an interbank network as a direct random network. The structure of the desired network is a realization
of the empirical studies which are explained in previous sections. We weight each link (financial relation) of the
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Table 2: Comparison of the Results of our Impact Index and SinkRank (Sorama¨ki and Cook (2013))
No Name Bank Degree+ Degree− Impact Index Inv-SinkRank Total Received Total Sent Equity
1 San 286 318 4.472092691 0.131266875 5.35E+09 6.13E+09 6.42E+09
2 Mallardshire 546 645 14.02179686 0.345049668 1.13E+10 1.37E+10 1.35E+10
3 Campbell 565 528 2.555336914 0.255536592 1.23E+10 1.11E+10 1.48E+10
4 Midsomer 413 331 4.327629834 0.154341717 8.41E+09 6.70E+09 1.01E+10
5 Rutshire 305 326 6.031221629 0.144775534 6.48E+09 7.11E+09 7.78E+09
6 Braddock 285 259 7.384959536 0.11383881 5.97E+09 5.27E+09 7.16E+09
7 Chinquapin 76 60 2.021948895 0.016499552 1.10E+09 8.24E+08 1.32E+09
8 Fatchakulla 25 21 0.896847037 0.004000575 2.59E+08 2.05E+08 3.11E+08
9 Radfordshire 20 28 0.275514539 0.006118699 2.30E+08 3.04E+08 2.76E+08
10 Barsetshire 9 13 0.141456433 0.002092251 7.31E+07 1.01E+08 8.77E+07
11 Beechum 10 8 0.128461665 0.001245738 7.41E+07 6.10E+07 8.89E+07
12 Ramilly 12 12 0.534263772 0.002795518 1.32E+08 1.37E+08 1.59E+08
13 Mississinewa 3 7 1.203555812 9.40E-04 2.33E+07 5.20E+07 2.80E+07
14 Faulconer 9 6 0.246758203 9.49E-04 6.45E+07 5.13E+07 7.74E+07
15 Wyvern 7 3 0.429629287 4.85E-04 7.78E+07 2.59E+07 9.33E+07
16 Southmoltonshire 11 6 0.157081723 9.17E-04 8.96E+07 4.16E+07 1.08E+08
17 Slopshire 1 1 0.209457126 5.78E-05 2743850.7 3611388.36 3.29E+06
18 Oklawaha 4 5 2.522957064 5.71E-04 2.03E+07 2.78E+07 2.43E+07
19 Cotton 3 6 0.829804475 9.38E-04 2.35E+07 4.85E+07 2.82E+07
20 Maycomb 2 1 0.036815624 8.76E-05 8173403.33 4175319.83 9.81E+06
21 Alderney 2 4 0.264143582 4.77E-04 1.06E+07 2.32E+07 1.27E+07
22 Ford 2 5 0.098661454 7.08E-04 1.37E+07 2.90E+07 1.65E+07
23 Crow 2 2 0.063812832 1.10E-04 8928062.78 6856694.69 1.07E+07
24 Saudi 1 1 0.178489716 6.04E-05 2876870.83 3505134.15 3.45E+06
25 Bloom 1 4 0.220222296 4.68E-04 6486514.2 2.23E+07 7.78E+06
This table shows the information on total payment value received and sent, capital value and out-degree,
in-degree and ranking information of each bank. Results show that the distribution of Impact Index and
SinkRank are relatively positive skew with 1.62 as the degree of asymmetry of mean and correlated with
out-degrees and in-degrees. The banks, which are identified as systemic important banks, are highlighted.
Figure 4: Results of Applying Algorithm 4.3 on Example Network Dataset
This figures show results of applying algorithm 4.3 on example network dataset indicate two systemically
important banks; these banks are systemically important not just because of their balance sheet site but
even they have interactions to most of nodes in the system.
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Figure 5: Results of Applying Algorithm 4.3 and SinkRank Method (Sorama¨ki and Cook (2013))on Example Network Dataset.
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(b) Identify SIFI by our Impact Index
This figures shows results of applying algorithm 4.3 and SinkRank method on example network dataset.
Axises are a total number of payments sent and received by banks and size of bubbles is represented of
the magnitute of the systemic importance of banks calculated by both algorithms.
network with exposure magnitudes and each node (bank) with information on the balance sheet. The total assets of
a bank is the sum of its loans to other banks, as interbank assets, and the sum of its external assets. The liability of
a bank includes the amount of loans taken from other banks, as interbank liabilities, and also its customer deposits.
Glasserman and Young (2015) showed that the distributions of claims within the system are uniformly distributed as a
result of intensity of banks to maximize their diversity lending strategy by distributing loans to all their debtors equally.
The simulation is performed in a way that ensures that the generated network represents a real-world banking
system. As mentioned earlier , empirical studies found that an interbank network has a fat-tailed degree. Exposures
and in-degrees and out-degrees of the network follow Pareto distribution and power law distribution, respectably. This
structure is stable across time. Because of the heterogeneous characteristics of the interbank liability (asset) structure,
different interbanking systems are simulated. With given exposure, we estimate interbank assets and liabilities of
banks. Equity is the proportion of one to two percent of risk-weighted assets. This proportion is randomly assigned
to each bank. We balance each bank account with its deposit. Figure 6 presents distributions of simulated financial
variables and network characteristics. Financial variables capital, deposit and exposure have skewed (non-symmetric)
distributions. Network properties size, out-degree, in-degree, betweenness, and closeness have non-symmetric distri-
butions that are right skewed.
From theoretical findings of Allen and Gale (2000), if there exists a directed financial link from each bank to all
others, banks spread their claims and diversify their contagion risk equally. We simulate a complete network to have
an uniform perspective on a financial network and its asset-liability structures, (see Figure 8).
(Allen and Gale, 2000) also indicated that less complete system increased the possibility of contagion risk due
to highly interconnected links and lacks of potential for risk diversification. Past empirical studies showed that the
full interconnected simulated system is an unrealistic structure, and we need to omit some directed edges within the
simulated network. Scale-free networks is one type of network with incomplete connectivity. Albert and Baraba´si
(2002) proposed the Barabasi-Albert (BA) algorithm for generating random scale-free networks. This algorithm starts
with a set of small fully connected nodes and adds one node at a time with exactly k edges. Preferential attachment
probability (proportion to the number of node’s edges) is used to attach a new node to an existing node. This process
continues until all nodes became connected. Under this procedure, it is possible for multiple edges to have a pair of
nodes, and create loops in the network. In a typical financial system, institutions are serially connected in a way that
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Figure 6: Histogram of Simulated Balance Sheet Data
This figure plots the histogram simulated interbank assets, external assets,
capital and deposit of institutions in the network. The variables are skewed
distributed and they are correlated.
Figure 7: Histogram of Centrality Indices of Simulated Network
The histograms of out-degree, in-degree, betweenness, and closeness are given.
One can see that out-degree and in-degree are heavy-tailed distributed and
they are positively correlated. Betweenness centrality and closeness centrality
have low variation.
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Figure 8: Visualization of Complete Network:
Note: circle format (right side) and Cartesian format (left side). In a complete
network there is a direct (indirect) connection between all pairs of nodes.
a preceding institution is connected to the foremost one. Figure 9 shows a BA network in the circle and cartesian
formats.
Figure 9: Visualization of BA Network
Note : circle format (right side) and cartesian format (left side). This network
is a scale-free network and the degree distribution of degrees follow a power
law.
7.1. Numerical results
7.1.1. A comparison between approximation and optimal solutions
In this section, we compare our approximation solution with an optimal solution of the problem (19). The numer-
ical results presented here were obtained by using Matlab’s built on a PC running under processor (Intel Core 2.30
GHz). We firstly generate several random networks based on the Albert and Baraba´si (2002) (BA) algorithm and also
complete networks. Then, we simulate financial data for each bank with previously described distributions.
The optimal solution is obtained from built-in function (lsqlin) which solves constrained linear least square prob-
lem with interior point method. We create linear constraints of optimization problem according to financial relations
in the network.
In order to compare the algorithm 4.3 with the optimal algorithm (interior point method), the relative error is defined
as follows:
RelErr =
(ErrAlg1 − Errinterior)
Errinterior
, (38)
where ErrAlg1 is the minimum objective value of algorithm 4.3 and Errinterior is an objective value of an optimal solu-
tion.
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Tables 3a and 3b present the numerical result obtained from the algorithm 4.3 with BA and complete network
topologies while the number of nodes and edges are increased exponentially.
Table 3: Comparison of Approximation and Optimal Methods
Size 50 100 200
Interco 2420 4821 10475
Max in 129 222 403
Max out 135 214 394
Tol 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−3 10−4 10−5
Time 10−3 10−2 0.015 0.0039 0.0075 0.026 0.019 0.055 0.182
Ite 18 58 182 24 77 244 44 151 477
RelErr 0.034 0.043 0.050 0.054 0.053 0.050 0.123 0.122 0.11
(a) Numerical results of BA network
Size 50 100 300
Interco 9718 39474 359039
Max in 234 443 1311
Max out 223 453 1290
Tol 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−3 10−4 10−5
Time 0.001 0.0013 0.0038 0.002 0.005 0.018 0.028 0.095 0.304
Ite 16 52 164 16 51 162 16 51 162
Rel-Err 0.030 0.029 0.05 0.050 0.049 0.045 0.062 0.060 0.062
(b) Numerical results of complete network
Note: CPU time and relative error of algorithms 4.3 toward the above-mentioned op-
timal solution are reported for both simulated networks of BA network and complete
network. Size is number of nodes in the network, ”Interco” is the total number of in-
terconnections and ”Max in”, ”Max out” are the maximum number of in-degree and
out-degree,respectively. ”Ite” is the number of iterations of the solution procedure to
reach a tolerance value.
Computational results in Table 3 indicate that the algorithm 4.3 requires less CPU time for producing the much
more accurate approximation solution to the optimal solution obtained by Matlab’s built solver function. Moreover,
CPU time does not increase exponentially when the size of the network grows. The results also show that the com-
plexity of our algorithm does not depend on the number of interconnections, but on the number of nodes only. Thus,
this algorithm can find an approximation solution to a large problem relatively close to the optimal solution with a
very small error.
7.2. Results of numerical experiments
In this section, we present the results of simulations of the model and identify key players in the system and
determine factors that cause the instability of the network. In the simulation, we generate a BA scale-free (directed)
network with empirical properties of study Brazilian interbank networks by e Santos and Cont (2010). In each sim-
ulation, one to ten percent of networks’ nodes received deposit shocks. These shocks could spread throughout the
entire or a part of the system. These shocks also can be exogenous factors which have a strong influence on the entire
system. Figure 10 shows the average of impact indexes of 100 simulations and its 95% confidence interval. To have a
robust estimation of impact index, we varied the percentages of nodes that received shocks in each simulation.
We hypothesize that impact indexes can be explained by means of the network which indicate the role and posi-
tion of institutions in the financial system. To test this hypothesis, we regress the impact index on the balance sheet
variables and centrality diameters of the network. Table 5 presents the results of the impact of network properties
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Figure 10: Average of Impact Index and Corresponding 95% Confidence Interval.
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The figure presents the average of estimation of impact index from 100 simulations (solid
line) and 95% confidence interval (dash line). In each simulation, a different number of
nodes are hit by deposit shocks.
(size, out-degree and in-degree) on measuring systemic risk. We use a Tobit model 2 to estimate the impact of capital,
deposit, assets, and exposure on the impact index. Results from Tobit model and its marginal effects indicate an over-
all positive effects of changing capital and deposit on measuring systemic impact. The estimated coefficients capital,
deposit and external assets are all positive and significant at 90%, 95% and 99% levels, respectively.
In the next step, we add each network diameter to the base model (model 1). Based on Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), we believe that network properties like degrees closeness and
betweenness can explain the most variation of impact index and make other factors insignificant. From results pf the
average marginal effect of models, we conclude that changing closeness has the highest average impact on impact in-
dex. Nevertheless, these network diameters can present the scope of influences of an institution on its counterparties,
and at stress time, how much this institution can transmit the risk to the system.
Generally, these indicators of centrality are correlated and contain common information, and low correlation be-
tween them indicates valuable information about network formation. Generally, SIFIs should have high value in terms
of network centralities. Figures 11a, 11b and 11c illustrate the relation between network centralities. An institution
with the high-value degree and low-value betweenness is considered as an institution with a large number of coun-
terparties and the ability to spread the stress with high speed. Institutions with the high-value degree and low-value
closeness might root in a group which is far away from the rest of the network. High-value closeness and low-value
betweenness indicates institutions with having multi-layers of counterparties and multiple connections in the network.
These institutions have a high impact on their neighbors. Finally, the institutions that have high-value betweenness
and low-value closeness try to monopolize the relations from a small number of counterparties to a large number.
2We use Tobit model since the impact index is above zero and we have checked hypothesis of homoscedasticity and normality of residuals by
the Conditional Moment (CM) test (Newey (1985); Tauchen (1985)).
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Table 4: Discriptive Statistics of Simulated Network
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Panel I: non Systemic internal asset 100.1608 116.034 4.131724 64.2117 684.3691
external asset 27.68229 26.9476 2.889826 17.94683 141.8025
capital 14.41384 17.29865 .3235944 8.162905 99.56005
deposit 63.34887 56.16821 7.700143 47.20529 351.2374
in degree 8.844444 9.459448 1 5.5 50
out degree 8.766667 8.991944 1 5 42
closeness .0047617 .0006452 .003268 .0046948 .0064103
betweenness .0026189 .0102355 0 0 .0664723
Panel II: systemic internal asset 496.209 181.0448 74.98804 532.3312 737.1625
external asset 60.44734 80.09678 14.64383 30.266 281.8516
capital 63.03347 38.32387 13.44478 65.30916 125.8125
deposit 245.5183 142.2358 38.69307 221.2899 524.7476
out degree 42.4 13.89804 8 46 57
in degree 43.1 13.11869 9 47 56
closeness .006456 .0005866 .0049261 .0066228 .0070423
betweenness .0719681 .0506624 .000404 .0666043 .1301973
Panel III: total internal asset 139.7656 171.2983 4.131724 72.89974 737.1625
external asset 30.9588 36.5191 2.889826 21.32403 281.8516
capital 19.2758 24.84822 .3235944 11.28302 125.8125
deposit 81.56582 87.70555 7.700143 51.16003 524.7476
in degree 12.2 14.15499 1 6.5 57
out degree 12.2 13.98195 1 6.5 56
closeness .0049312 .0008164 .003268 .0047619 .0070423
betweenness .0095538 .0276537 0 0 .1301973
Tests of differences of mean of systemic and non systemic (simulated network)
Variable t-test Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
internal asset -6.7650 -4.550
external asset -1.2855 -2.149
capital -3.9672 -4.205
deposit -4.0155 -4.240
in degree -7.4458 -4.638
out degree -8.0682 -4.814
closeness -8.5746 -4.757
betweenness -4.3189 -5.647
The above table presents the discriptive statistics of simulated network for both systemic
and non-systemic members. One can see the differences of network indicators of systemic
and non-systemic nodes. The below table confirms the significant differences of means of
network properties which are tested by t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
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Table 5: Impact Index Regression on the Information of Balance Sheet and Node Centrality in Networks
Coefficients of Tobit Model of Impact Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
model
Ln(capital) 0.0818∗∗ 1.055 0.0367 0.0469 -0.0124
(0.0280) (0.0305) (0.0267) (0.0316) (0.0485)
Ln(deposit) 0.363∗∗∗ 1.188 0.166 0.195∗ 0.0957
(0.0885) (0.108) (0.0840) (0.0882) (0.170)
Ln(external asset) -0.127∗ 0.962 -0.0384 -0.0548 -0.0215
(0.0554) (0.0514) (0.0502) (0.0468) (0.0720)
Ln(exposure) 0.0452 0.955 -0.0153 -0.0414 0.253∗
(0.0475) (0.0439) (0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0937)
Ln(in-degree) 1.302∗∗∗
(0.0740)
Ln(out-degree) 0.251∗∗∗
(0.0298)
Ln(clossness) 1.773∗∗∗
(0.370)
Ln(betweenness) 0.0932∗∗
(0.0280)
cons -0.970∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ 9.291∗∗∗ -0.0469
(0.175) (0.0894) (0.164) (2.118) (0.632)
sigma
cons 0.298∗∗∗ 1.321∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.0257) (0.0340) (0.0251) (0.0287) (0.0544)
N 100 100 100 100 36
AIC 53.53 42.18 31.49 29.91 30.48
BIC 69.16 60.42 49.73 48.14 41.57
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Average Marginal Effects of Tobit Model of Impact Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln(capital) 1.059∗∗ 0.0377 0.0261 0.0332 -0.0107
(0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0190) (0.0225) (0.0421)
Ln(deposit) 1.288∗∗∗ 0.121 0.118∗ 0.138∗ 0.0829
(0.0802) (0.0640) (0.0601) (0.0633) (0.147)
Ln(external asset) 0.915∗ -0.0274 -0.0273 -0.0389 -0.0187
(0.0356) (0.0377) (0.0358) (0.0335) (0.0623)
Ln(exposure) 1.032 -0.0320 -0.0108 -0.0293 0.220∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0323) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0813)
Ln(in-degree) 0.185∗∗∗
(0.0386)
Ln(out-degree) 0.178∗∗∗
(0.0195)
Ln(clossness) 1.257∗∗∗
(0.256)
Ln(betweenness) 0.0807∗∗
(0.0250)
N 100 100 100 100 36
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The dependent variable is impact index with above zero value. Thus, we need to
use a censored regression model like Tobit model. To satisfy the primary condition of Tobit
model, we use natural logarithm of independent variables. In Tobit model, since the latent
variable can be extended below zero, the interpreting the effect of independent variables
(coefficients) is not valid instead we need to estimate marginal effects which can explain the
effects while the latent variable being at/or above zero.
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Figure 11: Relationship Between Centrality Degrees
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(a) Clossness versus Betweenness
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(c) Degree versus Betweenness
The figure plots the scatter plots of centrality degrees of network nodes. The SIFIs are
shown by the star symbols. Generally, these centrality degrees are correlated and contain
common information about connections of nodes.
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After we have determined the factors that lead to an institution became an SIFI, we estimate the sensitivity of
these factors on the change of the systemic risk level of institutions which are considered as SIFI. Another form of
presentation of this risk is odds-ratio which reflects the likelihood that an institution is classified as an SIFI. Here,
we use log-odds ratio, Greene (2003) showed that a change in the log-odds ratio of an event can be interpreted as a
change in the probability of an occurrence of that event.
We estimate the probability of an institution to be ranked as an SIFI from the equation: (36). Figure 12c shows
that probability density function that institutions are classified as SIFIs. This figure also shows that changing this
probability with changing the value of central degree indicators of SIFIs. With defining quantiles equation (31) ,
we classify the institutions in three groups and construct 95% confidence for each classification border. Figure 12b
presents the corresponding the log odds ratios. We test increasing or decreasing the log-odds ratio of risk of an
institution to be ranked as an SIFI by changing its value of central degree indicators. Results of tests are given in
Table 6. Overall results confirm that the significant decrease (-1.685401) of the average of log odds by decreasing
in-degree. We also observe an significant increase log-odds ratio (1.52049 and 0.9098) in average by decreasing out-
degree and closeness. The 99% confidence intervals are given for difference average of odds ratios. These evidences
confirms our hypothesis on the role of interconnection in stress propagation and amplification.
Table 6: Statistical Test of Changing Odds Ratios
Variable Obs Mean (diff) Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-statistic Wilcoxon
z-statistic
[99 % Conf. Interval]
∆log(odds changeindegre) 48 -1.685401∗∗∗ 0.1533723 1.062594 -10.9890 -6.031 -1.993946 -1.376856
∆log(odds changeoutdegre) 62 1.520497∗∗∗ 0.1223435 0.9633334 12.4281 6.846 1.275856 1.765137
∆log(odds changeclossness) 62 0.9098212∗∗∗ .07439545 0.5857904 12.2295 6.846 .7610583 1.058584
∆log(odds changebetween) 62 -.00218055∗∗∗ .0001791 .00141021 -12.1753 -6.846 -.0025387 -.0018224
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table reports results of sensitivity the logarithm of odds ratios by increasing centrality indicators.
We use t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test as a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test. We
compare two paired samples to assess their population average. Mean(diff) is an average of difference
of two samples. The corresponding 99% confidence intervals are given.
8. Empirical Study
In this section, on the empirical side, we investigate factors which lead to identifying SIFIs in a financial system.
As stated earlier, the BCBS uses an indicator-based method and comprises five groups of features and characteristics
of banks in determining the G-SIB. Banks should publicly disclose these metrics on the annual basis. These indicators
are used to rank banks and calculate capital adequacy ratio, minimum requirements, for each bank. The goal is then
to classify banks in terms of influence on stability of the system. Within these classes, the same level of regulation,
regardless of the internal ranking, is assigned.
To asses the theoretical model, an empirical model is conducted. We use a sample of 221 the largest banks in
each country. This global sample contains the information on financial aspects of banks which are chosen by BCBS
to identify G-SIB candidates. Our sample includes banks that are currently considered systemically important, and
banks that are or have been considered systemically important in the past. The sample of banks are divided into five
categories: a group of banks eventually were not considered to be G-SIBs, and four groups of systemically important
banks classified based different loss absorbency obligation according to the Basel III. Table 7 summaries the informa-
tion on the minimum capital requirement of these categories: the magnitude of the capital requirement for the lowest
bucket is 1.0% of risk-weighted assets and the highest bucket is 3.5%.
These Five indicators are applied in determining the G-SIB by BCBS:
I Size: it is the main measurement of systemic importance and can be quantified based on the overall exposure of
an institution. It also indicates the magnitude of potential distress or failure of an institution. Measuring the size is
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Figure 12: Relationship Between Centrality Degrees on Nodes in the Network
(a) Changing logarithm of Odds ratios of ranking
institutions as SIFIs
(b) Changing logarithm of odds ratios of ranking the first 25 in-
stitutions as SIFIs
(c) Probability of ranking institutions as SIFIs
The figure plot the probability and natural logarithm of the odds ratio of institutions might be con-
sidered as SIFIs. This probability would be changed if the centrality degrees of nodes are changed.
The red area represents the nodes with the highest probability ranked as SIFI and classified as the
first SIFI bucket. The yellow area represents the second class of SIFIs. The none systemic institutions
are located in the green area. The upper-right figure presets the natural logarithm of odds ratios in a
bigger size.
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Table 7: Classification on Global-SIFI
Non systemic Bucket 1 Bucket 2 Bucket 3 Bucket 4 Bucket 5 Total
Common Equity Tier 1 capital
(% of risk-weighted assets) 1 % 1.5 % 2 % 2.5 % 3.5 %
Year 2012 193 15 7 3 3 0 221
Year 2013 193 15 7 4 2 0 221
Year 2014 193 16 6 4 2 0 221
Year 2015 193 17 5 4 2 0 221
Total 772 63 25 15 9 0 884
The number of banks in the five categories of systemic important banks of 221 banks in four years.
The corresponding capital requirement as the proportion of risk-weighted assets is given. The majority
of banks are classified in bucket one with 1% capital requirement. Changing the size of each bucket
through years is due to updating the annual list SIFI by BCBS.
dependent on assumptions of the methodology used and management’s point of view. Basel III regulation Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) specified the measuring of the size, which is used for the leverage
ratio, as the total amount of exposures of a bank scaled by the summation of the total amount of exposures of all
banks in the sample. In our sample the total amount of exposures was not available for all banks, instead, we use
the total amount of assets. This variable is important to classify a bank as a systemic important and we expect
this variable to have a positive influence on increasing probability of a bank becoming a systemically important
bank.
II Interconnectedness: it measures the interrelation of banks in a financial system and how the resources are dis-
tributed among players in the system. The recent financial crisis indicates interconnectedness plays a key role in
the transmission of risk and can cause a cascading failure of counterparties. We can measure this indicator based
on shares of bank asset and liabilities in the financial system. In our sample, we have information on interbank
ratios and the amount of deposits from other banks, and we believe it has a positive effect on the probability of
bank to be ranked as a SIB.
III Substitutability/financial institution infrastructure: this indicator contains information on the importance role
of a financial institution to provide fundamental services in a particular business line. It also can show unknown
substitution costs of a financial institution. One can measure the financial institution infrastructure of a bank
with a number of payment activities and the amount of financed transactions in liability and equity markets. We
measure this indicator with a number of loans that a bank can provide for its customers. In the case of failure of
the bank, customers need to look for the similar service from an alternative institution.
IV Complexity: this indicator measures the functional complexity of a financial institution. The higher level of
complexity requires more time and cost to resolve a financial institution. One can measure the level of complex-
ity with an amount of OTC derivatives, available-for-sale securities, and level 3 assets. We measure this indicator
with the amount available for sale securities, liquid assets funding, and trading assets since these factors can open
channel for a bank for fire sale which is one of a significant dimension of systemic risk. We can have a hypothesis
of a positive impact of this indicator on the desired probability.
V Cross-jurisdictional activity: this indicator explains relatively the global financial activities of a bank and mea-
sures the international consequences of a bank’s distress or failure. We calculate this indicator as a propotion of
the total asset of a bank in the foreign market of the country where the bank is located. The foreign market index
is measured by the total value of exports of goods and services of a country as a percentage of its GDP on 1-7
scale (see: Schwab and Sala-i Martin (2015)).
Table 8 summarizes the variables which are used in our empirical study and Figure 13 illustrates the boxplots of
main variables. We obtain bank-level data from Bankscope database. Panels I and II summarize the information of
non-systemic (bucket 0) and systemic (buckets 1-5) banks , respectively. The total asset was an indicator of the size
of a bank and it was used to rank banks. From the result of the statistical test and an illustration of boxplot, we can
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observe the total assets of systemic banks is decreasing over years. Interbank ratio is calculated as the proportion
of due from counterparties to due to counterparties and indicates the interbank liquidity. We can observe that the
systemic banks are funds providers rather than funds borrowers. Meanwhile, these banks try to level this ratio over
the time. The liquid asset is calculated by a total of cash, trading securities and outstanding from other banks and
central banks. Results show that systemic banks are holding more liquid assets, and the amount of the liquid asset also
is decreasing over the time. Return on assets (ROA) indicates the profitability of a bank and an amount of operating
incomes scaled by total assets. From the result, we can observe non-systemic banks are more profitable.
Figure 13: Box Plots
(a) Box Plot of Interbank Ratios (b) Box Plot of Equity
(c) Box Plot of Assets
The figure plots the box plots (Box and Whisker Diagram )of the main variables (interbank, equity and
asset)for systemic and non-systemic banks over years. The box shows the location of the middle 50%
of the data. It can be seen the difference between systemic and non-systemic banks and changing the
amount of variables of systemic banks after recognizing as a G-SIFI.
8.0.1. Empirical Results
The section presents the results of our empirical study using bank panel data. Our potential caution of using the
aggregated sample for all countries is causing a bias in estimation of effects of factors to predict the systemic impor-
tant banks. To relieve this issue, we restrict our data sample to information on only countries who are members of
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Then, we repeat our experience for all countries. Our baseline
specification related to identifying the factor influenced on the classification of a bank as a G-SIFI. Our dependent
variable is an ordinal variable which contains information on global ranking of the banks. We regress this variable on
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Table 8: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Min 25th pct. Median 75th pct. Max
Panel I: non systemic bank Asset 1.42e+08 6.52e+08 772 41 968392.9 7080489 4.58e+07 1.40e+10
Ln(interbank ratio) 4.384796 1.636508 733 -3.912023 3.708437 4.680092 5.483052 7.784854
Net loans/total assets 34.46049 24.70773 772 -5.257587 8.432014 37.435 55.6685 91.676
Ln(deposits from banks) 1.78e+07 7.18e+07 772 -4.72e+08 40660 1218596 1.22e+07 8.68e+08
Ln (security for Sale) 2.22e+07 3.37e+07 772 -3.74e+07 227321.5 5595969 3.47e+07 2.68e+08
Liquid asset 46.94603 62.15001 772 -24.25128 17.445 32.19779 60.05086 941.58
Cross-jurisdictional 73.61051 29.62508 546 12.0676 50.9147 68.8607 93.48219 155.6738
ROA 1.138765 2.639387 772 -15.74 .275 1.095 2.08 19.33
Equity 9540839 5.42e+07 772 -1.75e+07 58193.5 510518.5 2842683 7.30e+08
Panel II: systemic banks Asset 1.10e+09 5.85e+08 112 5418100 6.61e+08 1.12e+09 1.55e+09 2.21e+09
Ln(interbank ratio) 4.697136 .807599 112 3.205588 4.111053 4.729934 5.187104 6.804274
Net loans/total assets 39.76857 16.11145 112 1.381 32.276 40.4515 51.6765 75.713
Ln(deposits from banks) 1.26e+08 8.92e+07 112 88100 5.25e+07 1.19e+08 1.92e+08 3.61e+08
Ln (security for Sale) 1.33e+08 1.30e+08 112 -946417.1 5.45e+07 8.36e+07 1.80e+08 6.82e+08
Liquid asset 34.63473 19.22803 112 8.07 21.78 33.125 39.08 99.2
Cross-jurisdictional 128.2727 10.2701 108 106.4944 122.6266 128.9281 136.2464 150.0981
ROA .4790179 .4603601 112 -1.53 .26 .44 .725 1.51
Equity 7.19e+07 4.90e+07 112 520600 3.84e+07 5.91e+07 9.19e+07 2.35e+08
Panel III: total Asset 2.64e+08 7.18e+08 884 41 1499488 9557034 1.21e+08 1.40e+10
Ln(interbank ratio) 4.426195 1.555561 845 -3.912023 3.796001 4.686566 5.443074 7.784854
Net loans/total assets 35.13301 23.84935 884 -5.257587 9.752098 38.31072 54.7755 91.676
Ln(deposits from banks) 3.15e+07 8.25e+07 884 -4.72e+08 68298.5 2078425 2.86e+07 8.68e+08
Ln (security for Sale) 3.62e+07 6.67e+07 884 -3.74e+07 325522 1.21e+07 4.84e+07 6.82e+08
Liquid asset 45.38623 58.617 884 -24.25128 17.81 32.725 57.15964 941.58
Cross-jurisdictional 82.63729 34.09319 654 12.0676 54.26487 79.95827 110.8356 155.6738
ROA 1.055178 2.481452 884 -15.74 .265 .935 1.91 19.33
Equity 1.74e+07 5.74e+07 884 -1.75e+07 74176.5 815500 7435457 7.30e+08
Tests of differences of mean of systemic and non systemic banks
Variable t-test Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
Asset -15.9694 -15.181
Ln(interbank ratio) -3.2084 -0.419
Net loans/total assets -3.0107 -1.779
Ln(deposits from banks) -21.1901 -13.507
Ln (security for Sale) -22.1139 -13.442
Liquid asset 4.2722 0.842
Cross-jurisdictional -34.0047 -14.753
ROA 6.3146 6.082
Equity -12.4121 -15.409
The first table contains the information (provided by Bankscope) on bank-level for two classes of systemic and non-
systemic banks. In this classification, non-systemic banks are corresponding to banks in the bucket 0, systemic banks
in buckets 1-5 in the Table 7. Total asset is an indicator of the size of a bank and it contains the information on
variances in asset liquidity. Interbank ratio measures the interbank liquidity and it is calculated as the proportion
of due from counterparties to due to counterparties. This ratio with above one value indicates that the bank is a
funds provider rather than a funds borrower. Net Loans / Total Assets is a ratio of the assets of a bank are associated
with loans. A liquid asset is a total of cash, due from other banks like the central bank, the credit of Institutions as
well as government and trading securities. Availableforsale securities are the total fair value of securities which are
available for sale and indicates unrealized profits or losses. Return on assets (ROA) is an operating income scaled by
total assets and indicates profitability of a bank.
The second table provides the results of t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of whether the mean for variables
are the same for systemic and non-systemic banks. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric test (distribution-
free) analog with the t-test.
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the main indicators which determined by BCBS. We control banks profitability on the bank-level and GDP (PPP) per
capital of the countries on the country-level. These variables measure the relative performance of banks and countries
which the banks are located, respectively. Year fixed effect capture overall events and OECD-level effects control
time-invariant market characteristics.
We empirically examine the prediction of our theoretical framework and test our hypothesis. Table 9 reports
the results of identification systemic risk factors. The results show that the positive relation between indicators like
interbank ratio, deposits from banks and Cross-jurisdictional on the estimation of G-SIFIs. Coefficients of logit
regression are in log-odds units and the standard errors are reported in parentheses. In logistic regression, the odds
the ratio is an association between an indicator and dependent variable and calculated as an exponential function of
the logit coefficient. The results also show that some indicators like interbank ratio, deposits from banks and Cross-
jurisdiction are associated with higher odds of systemic risk. Table 9 also reports the marginal effects of estimation the
change in probability each bucket when the indicator variables rise by one unit. Although, decreasing the predictive
power of the model due to few number of observations in the higher bucks, indicators like interbank ratio, deposits
from banks and Cross-jurisdiction are still significant factors.
In table 10, we repeat our baseline model by restricting our sample to OECD countries only. Although the
magnitude of the coefficients is slightly changed, we can observe consistent results with baseline model, and the
estimated model for OECD subsample is comparable to the model for the entire sample.
8.0.2. Addressing Endogeneity Problem
Generally, in estimating ordered categorical variables with using short panel data (with small T and N → ∞) co-
efficients of logit and probit models might be biased (see : Greene (2003)). It creates bias since nuisance parameters
which should be estimated grow rapidly as a number of panel (N) increases. Then data observed as grouped on the
individual panel with few variation over time. In this condition, fixed effects models are mostly not estimable and re-
gression with robust standard errors might not be applied. The bootstrapped standard errors option can partially solve
the problem. Mccullagh and Tibshirani (1990) and Firth (1993) proposed a modification of log-likelihood estimation
procedure to obtain a more stable estimation for short panel data. Hayakawa (2012) proposed Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimators for the short dynamic panel.
In a short panel, errors are not correlated over panel, but over time for a given panel. Mundlak (1978) pro-
posed a correction method of logit model to control unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity. This method
transforms the explanatory variables into cluster-mean deviations. This method adds either cluster-mean differenced
variables or cluster-means to the list of explanatory variables (hybrid model). In other words, this method is a mean-
centering procedure corresponding to moving the expectation of the original variable to the average point by subtract-
ing off the variable averages over time from the data.
To apply this mean-centering operation, we use the following operator:
XC = HX, (39)
where the operatorH is defined as:
H = (Iit − 1.t1T.t ). (40)
The matrix-centering operatorH transfers the variable X to XC which is a mean-centered variable over time.
We consider the mentioned endogeneity problem and have a robust model we apply this correction transformation
on the original variables. Table 11 reports the estimation of baseline model with correction of Mundlak (1978) for the
sample of all countries and a subsample which is restricted to only OECD Countries. One can see that the signs and
significant of coefficients are similar to the baseline models, however the magnitude of the coefficients are changed
especially in the first model. Since the correction method reduced the individual fixed effects which is correlated with
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Table 9: Average Marginal Effects (ME) and Odds Ratios from Ordered Logit Regression for All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Odds Ratios Bucket 0 Bucket 1 Bucket 2 Bucket 3 Bucket 4
Dependent variable: G-SIFI rank
Asset -4.32e-10 1.000 2.06e-11 -2.26e-12 -6.44e-12 -6.18e-12 -5.75e-12
(4.39e-10) (4.39e-10) (2.11e-11) (2.71e-12) (6.75e-12) (6.35e-12) (6.03e-12)
Ln(interbank ratio) 0.776∗∗∗ 2.172∗∗∗ -0.0370∗∗∗ 0.00405 0.0116∗∗ 0.0111∗∗ 0.0103∗∗
(0.209) (0.454) (0.00905) (0.00216) (0.00377) (0.00391) (0.00380)
Net loans/total assets 0.0141 1.014 -0.000672 0.0000735 0.000210 0.000202 0.000187
(0.00822) (0.00834) (0.000386) (0.0000559) (0.000129) (0.000125) (0.000119)
Ln(deposits from banks) 0.973∗∗∗ 2.645∗∗∗ -0.0464∗∗∗ 0.00508 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗
(0.206) (0.546) (0.00873) (0.00284) (0.00396) (0.00413) (0.00432)
Ln (security for Sale) 0.354 1.424 -0.0169 0.00185 0.00527 0.00506 0.00471
(0.199) (0.284) (0.00937) (0.00138) (0.00307) (0.00314) (0.00289)
Liquid asset 0.00401 1.004 -0.000192 0.0000209 0.0000598 0.0000574 0.0000534
(0.00284) (0.00286) (0.000136) (0.0000206) (0.0000433) (0.0000413) (0.0000401)
Cross-jurisdictional 0.0711∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ -0.00340∗∗∗ 0.000371 0.00106∗∗∗ 0.00102∗∗∗ 0.000947∗∗
(0.0164) (0.0176) (0.000739) (0.000228) (0.000308) (0.000299) (0.000329)
ROA -0.675∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ -0.00352 -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.00966∗∗∗ -0.00898∗∗
(0.144) (0.0734) (0.00634) (0.00209) (0.00274) (0.00284) (0.00297)
Equity -4.83e-09 1.000 2.31e-10 -2.52e-11 -7.20e-11 -6.92e-11 -6.43e-11
(2.76e-09) (2.76e-09) (1.29e-10) (1.90e-11) (4.19e-11) (4.26e-11) (4.03e-11)
Ln(GDPppp) 1.022∗∗∗ 2.777∗∗∗ -0.0488∗∗∗ 0.00533 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗
(0.205) (0.568) (0.00845) (0.00310) (0.00375) (0.00406) (0.00449)
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
cut1
cons 45.73∗∗∗ 7.22223e+19∗∗∗
(5.734) (4.14114e+20)
cut2
cons 47.92∗∗∗ 6.45478e+20∗∗∗
(5.840) (3.76945e+21)
cut3
cons 49.16∗∗∗ 2.23360e+21∗∗∗
(5.871) (1.31134e+22)
cut4
cons 50.36∗∗∗ 7.46518e+21∗∗∗
(5.883) (4.39189e+22)
N 581 581
Pseudo R2 0.5024 0.5024
AIC 433.3 433.3
BIC 503.1 503.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This table reports the results of ordered logit regression model for estimation of main drivers of SIFI. The
corresponding model is GS IFIit = const + Xit +Cit +α, where Xit is the matrix explanatory variables and
Cit is the matrix control variables and α is fixed effect variable. The dependent variable is G-SIFI which
contains the information on global ranking of banks. The second model is odds ratios of explanatory
variables. If the odds ratio is above (below) one then the likelihood of probability of that event increase
(decreases). We transfer skewed variables by taking the natural logarithm. Cuts are ancillary parameters
which are applied to estimate Predicted probabilities of each bucket. The average marginal effects for
each bucket is estimated. The Marginal effects explain the variation in probability when the explanatory
variable increments by one unit.
35
Table 10: Average Marginal Effects (ME) and Odds Ratios from Ordered Logit Regression for OECD Countries only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Odds Ratios Bucket 0 Bucket 1 Bucket 2 Bucket 3 Bucket 4
Dependent variable: G-SIFI rank
Asset 2.60e-10 1.000 -1.84e-11 -2.53e-12 6.92e-12 7.18e-12 6.82e-12
(2.87e-10) (2.87e-10) (2.01e-11) (3.30e-12) (7.86e-12) (8.17e-12) (7.56e-12)
Ln(interbank ratio) 0.629∗∗ 1.876∗∗ -0.0444∗∗ -0.00613 0.0167∗ 0.0174∗ 0.0165∗
(0.218) (0.408) (0.0142) (0.00448) (0.00665) (0.00707) (0.00697)
Net loans/total assets 0.0309∗∗ 1.031∗∗ -0.00218∗∗∗ -0.000301 0.000822∗ 0.000852∗∗ 0.000809∗
(0.00990) (0.0102) (0.000657) (0.000217) (0.000334) (0.000326) (0.000316)
Ln(deposits from banks) 0.735∗∗∗ 2.085∗∗∗ -0.0519∗∗∗ -0.00715 0.0195∗∗ 0.0203∗∗ 0.0192∗∗
(0.210) (0.437) (0.0133) (0.00481) (0.00622) (0.00718) (0.00740)
Ln (security for Sale) -0.0134 0.987 0.000943 0.000130 -0.000355 -0.000368 -0.000350
(0.184) (0.182) (0.0130) (0.00179) (0.00492) (0.00508) (0.00482)
Liquid asset 0.00462 1.005 -0.000326 -0.0000450 0.000123 0.000127 0.000121
(0.00325) (0.00327) (0.000231) (0.0000362) (0.0000901) (0.0000902) (0.0000898)
Cross-jurisdictional 0.122∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ -0.00862∗∗∗ -0.00119 0.00325∗∗∗ 0.00337∗∗∗ 0.00320∗∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0235) (0.00134) (0.000676) (0.000856) (0.000867) (0.000910)
ROA -0.573∗∗ 0.564∗∗ 0.0405∗∗ 0.00558 -0.0153∗∗ -0.0158∗ -0.0150∗
(0.197) (0.111) (0.0137) (0.00345) (0.00587) (0.00625) (0.00622)
Equity -5.81e-09 1.000 4.10e-10 5.66e-11 -1.55e-10 -1.60e-10 -1.52e-10
(4.02e-09) (4.02e-09) (2.75e-10) (5.84e-11) (1.13e-10) (1.20e-10) (1.09e-10)
Ln(GDPppp) 0.684∗ 1.982∗ -0.0483∗ -0.00666 0.0182∗ 0.0189∗ 0.0179∗
(0.283) (0.560) (0.0190) (0.00502) (0.00864) (0.00847) (0.00853)
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
cut1
cons 37.52∗∗∗ 1.96548e+16∗∗∗
(5.381) (1.05753e+17)
cut2
cons 40.28∗∗∗ 3.11060e+17∗∗∗
(5.544) (1.72455e+18)
cut3
cons 41.75∗∗∗ 1.35088e+18∗∗∗
(5.599) (7.56312e+18)
cut4
cons 43.08∗∗∗ 5.10301e+18∗∗∗
(5.624) (2.87006e+19)
N 258 258
Pseudo R2 0.4541 0.4541
AIC 354.8 354.8
BIC 411.7 411.7
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This table provides the results of baseline model for OECD countries only. Several econometric concerns
arise in an international comparison a dataset contains information on all countries. The aim of OECD
is to improve the economic and social well-being of words by setting international standards on various
political and economic issues. Although banking regulations are varied across OECD countries, they
are strongly connected and each country member can have significant influences on other members. One
can see that the sign and significant of coefficients of regression are consistent with baselines model and
just magnitudes of coefficients are slightly have been changed.
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error over time.
Overall, these results support our main hypothesis which is the relation between the degree of interconnection and
the likelihood of an institution to be classified as an SIFI.
9. Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we propose a simple model to facilitate the understanding of systemic risk in financial systems. Our
paper adds to the growing body of research on identification of key players in a financial network by introducing an
index to rank institutions in a network. To achieve it, we formulated the problem of ranking institutions as a fixed point
problem and reduced this problem into a convex optimization problem. We proposed an approximation solution to
the problem and developed an algorithm for computing the fixed point to reach equilibrium in a static cascade model.
The systemic rank of each institution is calculated by an impact index, and the result is robust to various exogenous
shocks in the system. We also studied the underline distribution of this index and prove the existence and uniqueness
of the index in a banking network. We applied our algorithm to a real payment system dataset and compared with an
existing algorithm.
In our numerical experiments, we generated a random network and compared our approximation solution with
an optimum solution. Computational results suggest that our algorithm requires less CPU time than the optimum
algorithm to exploit efficiently information about the systemically important nodes in a large-scale financial network.
Results also indicate that CPU time does not increase exponentially when the number of nodes and interconnections
of the network grow, which means that our algorithm has robust convergence behavior rate regardless of the network
structure.
We also investigated the knife-edge property of the interbank system and test our hypothesis on increasing and
decreasing the likelihood of an institution considered as an SIFI by applying some tools which were introduced by
the BCBS. The main objective of the experiment is to shed light on how to reduce the systemic impact of SIFIs by
modifying or reformulating the regulations’ policy. Numerical results show two main findings in the application of
our methodology: firstly, it highlights the systemic aspects of interdependent relations among the institutions. That
is the mitigation of the systemic impact of SIFIs could be expressed by imposing restrictions on the level of their
interconnections with other financial institutions. Secondly, our results provide an evidence that in a financial network
the likelihood of a member to be considered as an SIFI increase and decrease by increasing the degree of outcomes
(the number of debtors) and the degree of incomes (the number of creditors), respectively.
We empirically investigate factors which lead to identifying global SIFIs by using a sample of the largest banks in
each country. Our empirical outcomes support our theoretical finding that it is the association of the level of intercon-
nection and the likelihood of an institution to be ranked as an SIFI.
This is a developing area of study in finance that still needs more experimentation. In practice, this type of analysis
is not straightforward, mainly because of lack of sufficient knowledge about dynamics of the interbank system and
inconsistently recorded data on policy interventions. Having access to the corresponding data allows us to map the
entire financial system and assess its properties. There are several questions that arise from the reported results that
are not beyond the scope of this research questions. We leave the study of the optimal policies and their impacts on
financial stability in this framework to future works.
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Table 11: Ordered Logistic Regression for OECD and All Countries (Corrected Mundlak (1978) )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OECD Countries Odds Ratios (OECD Countries) All Countries Odds Ratios (All Countries)
Dependent variable: G-SIFI rank
AssetC 6.10e-10 1.000 1.64e-11 1.000
(3.57e-10) (3.57e-10) (3.12e-10) (3.12e-10)
Ln(interbank)C 0.260 1.297 0.698∗∗ 2.011∗∗
(0.240) (0.311) (0.213) (0.428)
Netloans/totalassetsC -0.000000423∗ 1.000∗ -0.000000792∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
(0.000000205) (0.000000205) (0.000000161) (0.000000161)
Ln(deposits f rombanks)C 1.68e-09 1.000 7.46e-09∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
(2.66e-09) (2.66e-09) (2.26e-09) (2.26e-09)
Ln(security f orS ale)C 1.85e-09 1.000 3.87e-09∗∗ 1.000∗∗
(1.48e-09) (1.48e-09) (1.46e-09) (1.46e-09)
LiquidassetC 0.00169 1.002 0.00221 1.002
(0.00315) (0.00315) (0.00208) (0.00208)
Cross − jurisdictionalC 0.129∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 0.0747∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0224) (0.0131) (0.0142)
ROAC -0.599∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.0851) (0.116) (0.0704)
EquityC -6.81e-09 1.000 -5.20e-09∗ 1.000∗
(5.09e-09) (5.09e-09) (2.26e-09) (2.26e-09)
Ln(GDPppp)C 0.559∗ 1.749∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 2.630∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.472) (0.185) (0.487)
Fixed year Yes Yes Yes Yes
cut1
cons -15.84 0.000000132 -69.20∗ 8.88e-31∗
(35.74) (0.00000473) (30.75) (2.73e-29)
cut2
cons -13.44 0.00000145 -67.16∗ 6.80e-30∗
(35.73) (0.0000518) (30.71) (2.09e-28)
cut3
cons -12.09 0.00000564 -65.95∗ 2.29e-29∗
(35.73) (0.000202) (30.70) (7.03e-28)
cut4
cons -10.82 0.0000201 -64.74∗ 7.63e-29∗
(35.72) (0.000717) (30.68) (2.34e-27)
N 272 272 634 634
Pseudo R2 0.413 0.413 0.4805 0.4805
AIC 385.2 385.2 459.8 459.8
BIC 439.3 439.3 526.5 526.5
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This table provides the results of the correction model of short panel logit model proposed by Mundlak
(1978). We transform the explanatory variables X into cluster-mean deviations XC . One can see that
results are comparable to baselines model, excluding interbank variable which is not significant factors
in OECD model. It is because of the recent growing interconnectedness of OECD economies. The
economic and banking activities of OECD are fragmented across countries.
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